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This essay has four objectives. The first is to document the current episode 
of capital inflows to Latin America based on data for ten Latin American 
countries. 6 The second is to compare the Latin American experience 
with that of a number of Asian countries that have also been the recipients 
of sizable capital inflows and examine to what extent the nature of the 
capital inflows and macroeconomic consequences are similar in the two 
cases. The third is to assess the role of external factors in accounting for 
the observed capital inflows and the real exchange rate appreciation in 
Latin America. Last, the chapter discusses the implications of capital inflows 
for economic policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The authors thank Sebastian Edwards and Jeffrey Frankel for their helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this chapter. This report is part of a research project by the authors on international capital flows 
at the Research Department at the  International Monetary Fund. 'he views expressed are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the International Monetary Fund. 
 
 2
Introduction 
The revival of substantial international capital inflows to Latin America 
is perhaps the most visible change in the economic situation of the region 
during the past two years. Whereas capital inflows to Latin America average about 
$8 billion a year in the second half of the 1980s, they surged 
$24 billion in 1990 and to $40 billion by 1991. Of the latter amount, 45 
percent went to Mexico, and most of the remainder went to Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Interestingly, capital is returning 
to most Latin American countries despite the wide differences in macroeconomic 
policies and economic performance between them. In most countries, the increased 
capital inflows have been accompanied by an appreciation 
in the real exchange rate, booming stock and real estate markets 
faster economic growth, an accumulation of international reserves, 
and a strong recovery of secondary market prices for foreign loans. 
Without doubt, an important part of this phenomenon is explained by 
the fundamental economic and political reforms that have recently taken 
place in a number of these countries, including the restructuring of their 
external debts. Indeed, it would have been difficult to attract foreign capital 
in the magnitudes mentioned here without these reforms. Nevertheless, 
while domestic reform is a necessary ingredient for capital inflows, it only 
partially explains Latin America's forceful reentry in international capital 
markets. Domestic reforms alone cannot explain why capital inflows have 
occurred in countries that have not undertaken reforms or why they did 
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not occur, until only recently, in countries where reforms where introduced 
well before 1990. 
This chapter maintains that some of the renewal of capital inflows to 
Latin America is due to external factors, and can be considered as an 
external shock common to the region. We argue that falling interest rates, 
a continuing recession, and balance-of-payments developments in the 
United States have encouraged investors to shift their resources to Latin 
America to take advantage of renewed investment opportunities and the 
increased solvency of that region. 1 Taking into account economic developments 
outside the region helps to explain the universality of these inflows. 
The present episode may well be an additional case of financial shocks in 
the center that affect the periphery, of the type stressed by Diaz Alejandro 
in several of his contributions. 2 
International capital inflows affect the Latin American economies in at 
least four dimensions. 3  
First, they increase the availability of capital in 
the individual economies and allow domestic agents to smooth out their 
consumption over time and investors to react to expected changes in 
profitability.  
Second, capital inflows have been associated with a marked 
appreciation of the real exchange rate in most of the sample countries. 
The larger transfer from abroad has been accompanied by an increase 
in domestic absorption. If some of the increase in spending falls on the 
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non traded good, its relative price will increase - the real exchange rate 
appreciates.  
Third, capital inflows have an impact on domestic policy 
making. The desire by some central banks to attenuate the degree of real 
exchange rate appreciation in the short run frequently leads them to intervene 
actively and purchase from the private sector part of the inward flow 
of foreign exchange. Moreover, the attempt to avoid domestic monetization 
of these purchases has often led the monetary authorities to sterilize 
some of the inflows. The extent to which the inflows are sustainable is also 
of concern to the authorities. The history of Latin America gives reason 
for such concern: The major episodes of capital inflows, during the 1920s 
and 1978-81, were followed by major economic crises and capital outflows, 
such as in the 1930s and the debt crisis in the mid-1980s.4   
Fourth, capital inflows can provide important - yet ambiguous - signals to 
participants in world financial markets. An increase in the inflows can be interpreted 
as reflecting more favorable medium- and long-term investment 
opportunities in the receiving country. But capital may also pour in for 
purely short-term speculative purposes, so-called hot money, to a country 
where lack of credibility of government policies leads to high nominal 
returns on domestic financial assets. Although it remains to be seen which 
of these two motives is dominant in the present episode, the strong recovery 
in secondary market prices of bank claims on several of these countries 
(see Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1993) and various other indicators 
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of country risk provide at least partial signals in support of the first, more 
favorable, motive.5 
This essay has four objectives. The first is to document the current episode 
of capital inflows to Latin America based on data for ten Latin American 
countries. 6 The second is to compare the Latin American experience 
with that of a number of Asian countries that have also been the recipients 
of sizable capital inflows and examine to what extent the nature of the 
capital inflows and macroeconomic consequences are similar in the two 
cases. The third is to assess the role of external factors in accounting for 
the observed capital inflows and the real exchange rate appreciation in 
Latin America. Last, the chapter discusses the implications of capital inflows 
for economic policy. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 
deals with the basic concepts and the relationship between capital inflows, 
the accumulation of reserves, and the gap between national saving and 
investment. The stylized facts about capital inflows to the region are documented 
in Section 3, which includes a comparison with several Asian 
countries.7 Section 4 provides a quantitative assessment of the role of external 
factors on the accumulation of reserves and on the real exchange 
rate appreciation in the ten countries considered. The implications of capital 
inflows for domestic economic policy are discussed in Section 5. 
 
2. The accounting of capital flows 
International capital flows are recorded in the nonreserve capital account 
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of the balance of payments (BOP). This account includes all international 
transactions with assets other than official reserves, such as transactions 
in money, stocks, government bonds, land, factories, and so on. When a 
national agent sells an asset to someone abroad, the transaction enters his 
country's balance of payments as a credit on the capital account and is 
regarded as a capital inflow. Accordingly, net borrowing abroad by domestic 
agents or a purchase of domestic stocks by foreigners is considered as 
a capital inflow, which respectively represents debt and equity finance. 
The simple rules of double-entry accounting ensure that, up to statistical 
discrepancies, the capital account surplus or net capital inflow (denoted 
by KA) is related to the current account surplus (denoted by CA) 
and to the official reserves account (denoted by RA) of the BOP through 
the identity: 
CA + KA + RA = 0   8 
A property of the current account is that it measures the change in the 
economy's net foreign wealth. A country that runs a current account deficit 
must finance this deficit either by a private capital inflow or by a reduction 
in its official reserves. In both cases the country is running down its 
net foreign wealth. Another characteristic of the current account is that 
national income accounting implies that its surplus is equal to the difference 
between national saving and national investment (CA = S - I). Accordingly, 
an increase in the current account deficit can be traced to either 
an increase in I, a decline in S, or any combination of these variables that 
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results in an increased investment-savings gap. Finally, the official reserves 
account records purchases or sales of official reserve assets by central 
banks. Thus, this account measures the extent of official foreign exchange 
intervention by the authorities, and is often referred to as the official 
settlements balance or the overall balance of payments. 
The foregoing discussion indicates that there are two polar cases of 
central bank response to increased capital inflows. If there is no intervention, 
the increased net exports of assets in the capital account are financing 
an increase in net imports of goods and services _ capital inflows 
would not be associated with changes in central banks' holdings of official 
reserves. At the other extreme, if the domestic authorities actively intervene 
and purchase the foreign exchange brought in by the capital inflow, 
the increase in KA is matched, one-to-one, by an increase in official reserves. 
In this case, there is no change in the gap between national saving 
and national investment, nor is there any change in the net foreign wealth 
of the economy. The capital inflow would be perfectly correlated with 
changes in reserves. 
 
3 Stylized facts  
In this section we quantify some of the key aspects of capital inflows to Latin 
America and the related underlying macroeconomic developments. 9   Last, we elaborate 
on the roIe of external developments, especially those in the United States. 
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Anatomy of capital inflows 
Table 13.1 presents a breakdown of Latin America’s external accounts.  It can be 
seen that a substantial  fraction of the capital inflows have been channeled toward an 
accumulation of international reserves. In countries like Chile and Mexico, an important 
part of the inflows has financed investment ; in countries like Argentina and Brazil there 
has been a marked rise in private consumption. 
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As Table 13.2 reports, the increase in net external borrowing accounts for 
 70 percent of the capital inflow in 1990-91. This is primarily due to borrowing 
by the pnvate sector from foreign private banks.13 Increased external bor~ 
rowing reflects the restoration of access to voluntary capital market financing 
following the crisis. 14 There were also increases in portfolio investment 
and foreign direct investment. The latter amounted to about $12 
billion, which was the result of privatizations.15 
  Since there has been a substantial degree of central bank intervention 
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in the face of capital inflows, there is an important degree of comovement 
between international reserves and capital inflows. In fact, if one is interested in 
monthly developments, for which direct data on capital inflows are not  
available, changes in reserves are a reasonable proxy for these inflows.  
 
Figure 13.1, which depicts monthly data on official international reserves for 
the countries in our sample, shows that, for most of the countries, there is 
a pronounced upward trend in the stock of official reserves starting from 
about the first half of 1990. In 1991, reserves accumulation accelerated as 
the monetary authorities in most countries reacted to the capital inflows 
by actively increasing their purchases of foreign assets constituting international 
reserves.  
 
Figure 13.2 provides evidence on the behavior of the real effective exchange 
rates during this period.17 With the exception of Brazil, all countries 
in our sample are experiencing a real exchange rate appreciation since 
January of 1991. In half of the cases the real appreciation of the domestic 
currency began before January 1991. Thus, the increase in capital inflows 
has been accompanied by a real exchange rate appreciation. This important 
link between capital flows and the real exchange rate in small open 
economies is already documented in the empirical literature (see Edwards 
1989). Combining the evidence from Figures 13.1 and 13.2 indicates that 
there is an important degree of comovement in reserves and real exchange 
rates across countries, despite the wide differences in policies and institutions 
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among them. 
 
Rates of return differentials and other macroeconomic developments 
Expected rates of return on available assets across countries playa key 
role in investors' decisions on whether to move capital internationally. 
Since data for expected returns are not readily available, and depend on 
how one models expectations, we first look at the stylized facts in the form 
of ex-post returns. As shown in Figure 13.3, there was a large increase in 
the U.S. dollar stock prices of major Latin American markets in 1991.18 
Argentina exhibits the biggest single annual return of almost 400 percent, 
while Chile and Mexico registered returns of about 100 percent eachY 
According to Salomon Brothers, $850 billion of foreign investment entered  
Brazil's stock market in the last four months of 1991, and about $600 
million was invested by foreigners in the Argentine equity market in 
1991.20 However, as the figures indicate and Figure 13.3 confirms, the stock 
market booms and the attendant high returns appear to materialize after 
capital has begun to flow into the region. It would thus be difficult to 
argue that high stock market return differentials were responsible for attracting 
the first wave of capital inflows. 
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Figure 13.4 provides evidence on the lending and deposit interest rate 
spreads between U.S. dollar equivalent domestic interest rates and interest 
rates in the United States. Because in some of these countries interest rates 
are regulated, and capital mobility is imperfect, spreads across the various 
countries cannot be compared in a straightforward manner. In addition, 
domestic interest rates vary markedly from country to country, as shown 
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in Figure 13.4, with Argentina and Peru having the broadest ranges and 
Bolivia and Colombia the narrowest. With these caveats in mind, the dominant 
impression from Figure 13.4 is that of relatively high interest differentials 
in Latin America in the 1990-91 period. It is also evident from 
Figure 13.4 that the pattern of spreads varies considerably across countries. 
In effect, this is not surprising since the monetary authorities in these 
countries have not reacted in a uniform manner to the capital inflows, and 
the timing of regulatory changes has also varied considerably across the 
sample countries. Although the relatively high differential rate of return 
on Latin American assets has been associated with a marked rise in capital 
inflows to the region, the inflows have not arbitraged away the large 
differentials. In some countries, such as Argentina, the interest rate differential 
decreased sharply as capital poured in; yet in others, such as Chile, 
there was a less pronounced response of the interest rate differential to the 
inflows (see Figure 13.4). As argued in Section 5, these different patterns 
may reflect cross-country differences in the authorities' choices between 
sterilized and nonsterilized intervention. 
In sum, three main stylized facts emerge with regard to interest rate 
differentials. First, there is little comovement in domestic interest rates (in 
U.S. dollars), and hence in spreads, across the countries in our sample, 
Second, as illustrated in Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), the 
"noise-to-signal ratio" of the domestic dollar rates varies substantially 
across countries. Countries offering the highest returns also had the greatest 
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volatility of returns.21 Third, despite the capital inflows the positive 
differentials have not been fully arbitraged away. 
Consider how developments in 1991, the year when capital inflows grew 
to about $40 billion, differ from those in earlier years. First, as Table 13.3 
shows, there was a renewal of economic growth. After three years of stagnation, 
real GDP increased by almost 3 percent in 1991. However, gross 
capital formation as percent of GDP remained constant at about the same 
level of the second half of the 1980s, suggesting a more efficient utilization 
of resources. At the same time, there was a marked drop in the rate of 
inflation (which nevertheless remained at a three-digit level for the region), 
and a significant reduction in central government fiscal deficits. The 
changing economic conditions in Latin America are also reflected in the 
region's debt and solvency indicators. At $441 billion, external debt 
amounts to 2.6 times exports of goods and services. Although still high, 
this ratio has decreased markedly from the 3.5 figure in 1986. Since most 
of Latin America's external debt to commercial banks is still in terms of 
floating rates, the drop in short-term u.s. interest rates and the drop in 
the debt to exports ratio has translated into a rapid decline in the external 
debt service ratio over the past two years. In fact, the level of the debt 
service ratio in 1991 is of the same order of magnitude as the levels observed 
before the debt crisis. These developments represent only part of 
the changing environment in Latin America of the early 1990s.In addition 
to these, the move toward privatization and deregulation, the introduction 
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of financial reforms, and the restructuring of existing external debt have 
all contributed to bringing Latin America back on the list of viable investment 
locations in world financial markets. 
A comparison with the Asian experience 
Latin America has not been the only region receiving sizable capital inflows 
in recent years. In effect, capital began to flow to Korea in 1988 and 
to a broader number of Asian countries sometime in 1989. Developments 
outside the region are frequently credited for the flow of capital to a group 
of countries that are, by and large, pursuing very diverse policies and have 
considerable differences in their macroeconomic environment. Specifically, 
it is argued that declining profit margins in Japan and in the United 
States have induced Japanese, and, to a lesser extent, American firms to 
reallocate to areas where lower wages prevail. In addition, during 1988-89 
a number of the emerging stock markets in Asia outperformed U.S. and 
Japanese stock markets by considerable margins, 22 
 
 
 18
 19
 20
Several interesting empirical regularities emerge from comparing the 
Latin American and Asian experience. First, as Table 13.4 illustrates, the 
swing in the balance on the capital account (as a percent of GDP) is of 
the same order of magnitude for the two regions. For the Latin American 
countries in our sample the change in the capital account amounts to 2.5 
percent of GDP; for the Asian countries the capital account surplus widens 
by 2.3 percent. Second, as is the case for most of the Latin American 
countries, there is a marked accumulation of international reserves during  
the capital inflow period of 1989-91 (see Figure 13.5). The sharp buildup 
in international reserves in the eight Asian countries considered suggests 
that, as in Latin America, the capital inflow was met with a heavy degree 
of intervention on the part of the various monetary authorities. Third, as 
mentioned previously, the various regional stock markets posted strong 
gains during the early stages of the capital inflow period.23 
There are, however, marked differences between Asia and Latin 
America in the macroeconomic impact of the capital inflows. As Figure 
13.2 illustrates, in Latin America the capital inflows have been accompanied 
by a real exchange rate appreciation (the exception is Brazil); in Asia 
such an appreciation is not the norm (Figure 13.6). The real exchange rate 
appreciated markedly in Korea and more modestly in Singapore but for 
the remaining countries no sustained appreciation is evident. As previously 
argued, the larger transfer from abroad is accompanied by an increase 
in domestic absorption. If some of the increase in spending falls 
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on the non traded good, its relative price will increase - the real exchange 
rate appreciates. 
Although the reasons why the real exchange rate responds differently 
to the inward flow of capital in the two regions are likely to be numerous., 
important differences in the composition of aggregate demand may play 
a key role in determining whether the real exchange rate appreciates or 
not. As Table 13.4 summarizes, for the Asian countries investment as a 
share of GDP increases by nearly 3 percentage points during the capital 
inflows period.  
By contrast, for the Latin American countries investment 
falls slightly - the inflows primarily finance higher consumption. It has 
often been the case for these countries that the increase in investment falls 
primarily on imported capital goods. On the other hand, the increase in 
consumption is less tilted toward the traded good. Other things equal, this 
observation would suggest that a real exchange rate appreciation is more 
likely when capital inflows finance consumption than when these finance 
investment.24 Another element influencing the real exchange rate by 
affecting both the level and composition of aggregate demand is the behavior 
of public consumption.  
Some of the Asian countries, most notably Malaysia and Thailand, reacted to the 
capital inflows by sharply contracting  fiscal expenditure.25 These expenditure cuts may 
reduce or eliminate the real exchange rate pressures through two channels: First, the 
fiscal contraction tends to reduce aggregate demand; second, public consumption 
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may be more biased toward the nontraded good than private sector 
consumption.26 Yet another reason that may explain why a real exchange 
rate appreciation failed to materialize was the conduct of monetary policy. 
While sterilization policies had limited success in reigning in monetary 
growth in a number of Latin American countries (see Section 5), these 
policies, which were often conducted by managing public sector savings, 
were more successful in achieving their objectives in several Asian countries 
(for a discussion of the experience of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Taiwan, see Reisen 1993).Their relative success in limiting the acceleration 
in the growth of the monetary aggregates had a dampening effect on 
aggregate demand and limited pressures on the price of nontraded 
goods. 
Another marked difference between Asia and Latin America is in the 
composition of capital inflows. Whereas in the Asian countries 40 percent 
of the increase in capital inflows came in the way of foreign direct investment, 
for the Latin American countries direct investment accounted for 
only 20 percent of the increase in inflows. This difference may help explain 
why concerns over "hot money" and a sudden reversal are more prevalent 
among Latin American policy circles than among their Asian counterparts_ 
It may also; in part, explain why the increase in investment is much 
greater for most of the Asian countries. 
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External factors 
Although it is difficult to point to a single dominant external factor that 
would account for the present capital inflows to Latin America, several 
external developments have converged to stimulate such inflows. First, 
there is the impact of the sharp drop in U.S. short-term interest rates, 
which are now at about half their level of two years ago and at their lowest 
levels since the early 1960s.By reducing the external debt service on floating 
rate debts, this decline in U.S. interest rates has improved the solvency 
of Latin American debtors. For a given level of interest rates in Latin 
America, these developments provide incentives for repatriation of capital 
held in the United States and for increases in borrowing by Latin American 
agents from capital markets in the United States.28 
 25
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Second, several external factors probably contributed to the increase in 
Latin America's current account deficit, and to the need to finance this 
deficit by increased capital inflows. Two such factors are the continuing 
recession in the United States and in other industrialized countries, and 
the continuation of the process of decline in Latin America's terms of 
trade throughout the past decade - which reflects mainly a decrease in the 
prices of petroleum and of other commodities. In principle, a decline in a 
given country's terms of trade can be expected to result in a larger current 
account deficit (the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect) and, in the absence 
of major intervention by the national authorities, in a larger capital inflow 
to finance this deficit. However, the changes in the terms of trade in 1990- 
91 are too small to account for the sharp increase in capital inflows. Thus 
it seems financial market shocks have played a larger role than terms of 
trade shocks in accounting for the capital inflows in the present episode. 
Third, it is seen that during both recent episodes of capital inflows to 
Latin America - in 1978-82 and 1990-91 - there were sharp swings in the 
private capital account of the U.S. balance of payments in the form of 
increased outflows and reduced inflows (Table 13.5). In fact, 1990 and 
especially 1991 mark the first years of net capital outflows from the United 
States29 after eight consecutive years of net inflows. As Table 13.6 documents; 
about 60 percent of the increased capital inflows in 1991 are directly 
associated with increased private capital outflows from the United 
States to Latin America, as recorded in the U.S. BOP accounts. Similarly, 
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the relatively large capital inflow of 1978-81 to Latin America was 
matched by increased private capital outflows from the United States.31 
Thus the data appear to support the notion that swings in private capital 
outflows from the United States playa key role as external impulses that 
affect the size of capital inflows into Latin America. 
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Fourth, in 1990 there were important regulatory changes in capital 
markets of industrial countries that reduced the transactions costs for 
agents accessing international capital markets from developing countries. 32 
4 Role of external factors: econometric analysis 
In this section, monthly data for ten Latin American countries covering 
the period January 1988 to December 1991 are used to analyze in more 
detail key features of the current episode of capital inflow. The analysis 
begins by establishing the extent of comovement of official reserves and 
real exchange rates between these countries, as these proxy for capita] inflow. 
We conduct a similar exercise for the Asian countries and compare 
the results. We then develop and estimate a model designed to provide a 
quantitative assessment of the relative importance of external shocks in 
the recent episode of reserves accumulation and real exchange rate appreciation. 
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Comovement of reserves and the real exchange rate 
Given the lack of monthly data (and for a number of the countries in 
the sample, quarterly data) on capital inflows, we examine here the joint 
behavior of international reserves and the real exchange rate, two variables 
in the present episode that are closely associated with the inflows. The 
previous section revealed that there is an important degree of comovement 
in reserves and real exchange rates across countries, which could be interpreted 
as reflecting the effects of a common external shock to Latin American 
countries (Figures 13.1 and 13.2). Accordingly, a first task in this section 
is to quantitatively examine this issue by using principal component 
analysis. Principal component analysis provides a way of describing the 
comovement in data series.33 We begin with ten time series, reserves for 
each country, and construct a smaller set of series, the principal components, 
which explain as much of the variance of the original series as possible. 
34  The higher the degree of comovement that exists among the original 
ten series, the fewer the number of principal components that will be 
needed to explain a large portion of the variance of the original series.35 
The procedure begins by standardizing the variables, so that each series 
has a zero mean and a unit standard deviation; this ensures that all series 
receive uniform treatment and that the construction of the principal component 
indexes is not influenced disproportionately by the series exhibiting 
the largest variation. 
For the Latin American countries we constructed the principal component 
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indexes for the period from January 1988 to July 1992. In addition, 
for comparative purposes two subperiods are considered: ]988-89 and the 
capital inflows episode of 1990-92. As Figure 13.1 shows and the top panel 
of Table 13.7 confirms, the extent of comovement in reserves during the 
capital inflow period of ]990-92 is considerable and higher than in the 
preceding two years. The first principal component explains 71 percent of 
the variation in reserves, while the second principal component explains 
an additional 16 percent of the variation. Hence, 87 percent of the variance 
of the ten reserves series is captured by two indexes, thus indicating 
a sizable degree of comovement. More formally, we tested the null hypothesis 
that the ten reserve series are linearly independent and found that we 
could reject this hypothesis at standard significance levels.36 
Applying the same procedure to the real exchange rate indicates that 
the degree of comovement across countries in the region also has increased 
in the recent capital inflows episode. The fraction of real exchange rate 
variance explained by the first principal component during 1990-92 is 68 
percent. The first two principal components explain a sizable 83 percent 
of the variance of the real effective exchange rate. 
As far as the increased covariation of reserves and the real exchange 
rate in the recent period is concerned, it may well reflect the effects of an 
external shock, common to the region, in the past two years. Interestingly, 
when we examined the principal components of the domestic inflation 
rate, a variable less obviously linked to external factors, we found that the 
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extent of covariation among the inflation rates of these ten countries had 
diminished rather than increased in the recent period.37 
The correlations between the first principal component of reserves and 
the individual country reserve series tend to confirm the evidence in Figure 
13.1. The regional index does quite well in accounting for reserve fluctuations 
in eight of the ten countries. For the real exchange rate, the results 
are also anticipated in Figure 13.2.38 The first principal components (plotted 
in the top panel of Figure 13.7) could be interpreted as regional ex- 
. change rate and reserves indexes, and as shown, the upward trend in the 
two series reflects the common regional experience of a real exchange rate 
appreciation and accumulation of reserves. Purged of country-specific 
idiosyncracies, they could reflect the influence of unobservable external 
factors common to the region as well as any coordinated internal developments 
in the region.39 
Applying the same methodology to the Asian data highlights some of the 
differences as well as some of the similarities between the experience of the 
two regions. As the bottom panel of Figure 13.7 shows, the pattern of comovement 
in reserves is similar to that found for the Latin American countries, 
with share of the total variation explained by the first principal component 
increasing during the capital inflow period. Similarly, the bottom panel 
of Figure 13.7 traces the "regional" reserve index and points to a sustained 
accumulation of reserves. Bycontrast to the Latin American experience, the 
degree of comovement in the real exchange rate during the capital inflow 
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period diminishes. Most important, as the bottom panel of Figure 13.7illustrates, 
the regional real exchange rate index captures the pattern most prevalent 
in Figure 13.6; namely, it highlights that the "regional" real exchange 
rate remained fairly stable in the face of capital inflows. 
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Quantifying the role of external factors 
In this section, the analysis proceeds in two stages: We first construct indexes 
of the unobserved external factors (or impulses), which are then 
incorporated in a structural vector autoregression. Second, we perform 
tests of exclusion restrictions on the foreign factors to determine their statistical 
significance. In modeling the external impulses, one could consider 
a whole vector of variables that could have an impact on Latin American 
economies. Here we opted for an unobserved index model, where the constructed 
index is correlated with the observed time series on a set of U.S. 
variables, which includes the nominal rates of return on real estate, stock 
and bond markets, short-term deposit and lending rates of interest, and 
detrended real disposable income. Specifically, we constructed and used 
the first and second principal components of these series. The first principal 
component captures the joint movement of the various interest rates 
and economic activity in the United States. The second principal component 
captures swings in returns on the equity and real estate markets. Having 
now a measure of external impulses, we embedded them in a structural 
vector autoregression. Defining PCI, and PC2, as the first and second 
principal components of the U.S. variables and denoting the logs of reserves 
and the real exchange rate by RES, and REX" respectively, the reduced 
form of the system is given by: 
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As equation (1) illustrates, we allow for dynamic interaction between 
the foreign factors but impose their temporal exogeneity by not including 
lagged values of the endogenous va~iables, reserves and the real exchange 
rate, in their respective equations (i.e., 0u = O2; = o'u = 0' 2i = 0); hence, 
we impose structure on the temporal relationships between these variables. 
40 Each equation in the system includes a constant and a time trend. 
Since the tests could be affected by the number of lags included in the 
right-hand side of each equation, and given that we had no strong priors 
on this issue, we used the Akaike and Schwarz criteria to select among 
one-, three-, six-, nine-, and twelve-month lag profiles.41 Both criteria, unless 
otherwise noted, yielded three lags as optimal. 
The reduced-form residuals, the u/s depend on the structural errors, e" 
and the contemporaneous relationships between the endogenous variables, 
specifically, u, = etA. So next, we consider the structure of the matrix 
A, which describes the contemporaneous relationships between the variables. 
Here we follow the methodology of Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard 
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(1989), in that a priori (structural) restrictions are imposed on the identifying matrix.  
Specifically, since there is a presumption that the foreign  
factors are exogenous, we do not allow for feedback from shocks to the 
domestic variables to the reduced form error of the first and second principal 
components of the foreign variables. In addition, we impose the restriction 
that the principal component indexes are orthogonal by construction, 
so that they depend on their own shocks, as in equations (2) and (3) 
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5 Policy implications 
The empirical analysis suggests that external factors have played a role in 
recent developments in Latin America. These capital flows, in turn, have 
contributed to the accumulation of reserves and appreciation of the real 
exchange rate.44 With these stylized facts as background, and taking into 
account the possibility that external factors may reverse their course in 
the future, the next key issue concerns the form and timing of the appropriate 
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policy response. 
Given that the 1980s has been a period of capital shortage for Latin 
America, the first question in discussing policy responses is: What is the 
rationale for policy to interfere with present capital inflows? Several countries 
in the region are in the process of concluding successful negotiations 
with their creditors, and effectively coming to grips with their fiscal imbalances. 
Thus, why would capital inflows - which in countries like Chile and 
Mexico have financed larger private investment - be undesirable? 
There are at least three types of concerns that policy makers tend to 
voice about capital inflows: (I) Since capital inflows are typically associated 
with real exchange rate appreciation and with increased exchange 
rate volatility, it is feared these may adversely effect the export sector; (2) 
capital inflows - particularly when massive - may not be properly intermediated 
and, therefore, may lead to a misallocation of resources; (3) capital 
inflows - especially when of a "hot money" variety - could be reversed 
on short notice, possibly leading to a domestic financial crisis. These concerns 
are not new. Actually, it has been argued that the depth of the debt 
crisis in the 1980s had a lot to do with the magnitude and sudden reversal 
of international capital flows. Consequently, these concerns have often led 
the authorities to react to the capital inflows by implementing a broad 
variety of policy measures. The remainder of this section examines the 
relative merits of some of those policies.45 We consider five intervention 
policies: (1) a tax on capital imports; (2) trade policy; (3) fiscal tightening; 
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(4) central bank sterilized and nonsterilized intervention of capital inflows; 
(5) a rise in marginal reserve requirements on bank deposits and more 
regulated bank investments in equity and real-estate markets. 
Taxes on short-term borrowing abroad were imposed in some countries – 
 Israel in 1978 and Chile 1991. Although this policy is effective in 
the short run, experience suggests that the private sector is quick in finding 
ways to dodge those taxes through over- and underinvoicing of imports 
and exports and increased reliance on parallel financial and foreign exchange 
markets. 
Trade policy measures can help to insulate the export sector from real 
exchange rate appreciation. A possibility is higher export subsidies. However, 
this policy distorts resource allocation between exportables and importables 
and the fiscal cost could be substantial. For example, to offset a 
20 percent overvaluation of the real exchange rate through export subsidies 
would increase fiscal expenditures by about 4 percent of GDP, given 
that the average export-GDP ratio for Latin America hovers around 20 
percent. Alternatively, the authorities could increase both export subsidies 
and import tariffs in the same proportion - so as to avoid creating further 
relative discrepancies between internal to external terms of trade - and 
announce that those subsidies and/or tariffs will be phased out in the future. 
Indeed, if the private sector perceives these measures as transitory, 
agents are likely to substitute future for present expenditure, contributing 
to cool off the economy and to attenuate the real exchange rate appreciation. 
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The fiscal cost of this package need not be large, particularly if the 
trade deficit is small. Furthermore, static distortions are not increased, 
since such trade policy does not change initial relative price distortions 
between exports and imports. However, this policy can be criticized on 
two different grounds. First, its effectiveness depends on the private sector 
believing that those subsidies and/or tariffs will be phased out in the future; 
otherwise, there is no reason for individuals to lower present expenditure. 
Thus, the effectiveness of the policy depends very strongly on credibility 
- both the credibility of policy, and the credibility of price forecasts. 
Second, this policy - as the previous one involving only subsidies - deviates 
from the general worldwide trend toward commercial opening and 
free-trade agreements. 
Another policy reaction to greater capital inflows could be to tighten 
fiscal policy - policy (3) - through higher taxes or lower government expenditure. 
While this policy is not likely to stop the capital inflow, it may 
lower aggregate demand and curb the inflationary impact of capital inf1ows. 
46 In that context, higher taxes may be less effective than lower government 
expenditure. Often when credit is widely available - as is the case 
when the country is subject to massive capital inflows - individuals' expenditures 
can be largely independent of their tax liability. This is espe- 
cially true if higher taxes are expected to be transitory- a somewhat plausible 
expectation since higher taxes would be associated with transitory 
capital inflows. In contrast, lower government expenditure - particularly 
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when this expenditure is directed to the purchase of nontraded goods and 
services - has a direct impact on aggregate demand, which is unlikely to 
be offset by an expansion of private sector demand. However, contraction 
of government expenditure is always a sensitive political issue. Overall, it 
is hard to provide a strong case for adjusting fiscal policy - which is usually 
set on the basis of medium- or long-term considerations - in response 
to short-term fluctuations in international capital flows. However, if the 
authorities had envisioned a tightening of the fiscal stance, the presence 
of capital inflow may call for earlier action in this respect. 
Sterilized intervention has been the most popular policy response to 
the present episode of capital inflows in Latin America. Leading examples 
of this policy are provided by Chile in 1990-91 and Colombia in 1991. 
Under capital inflows, this type of intervention amounts to a central bank 
sale of government bonds in exchange for foreign currencies and securities. 
47 This policy does not necessarily stop private agents from engaging 
in international loan transactions. However, if successful, it insulates the 
stock of domestic money from variations associated with capital mobility. 
If effective, sterilization will tend to increase domestic nominal and real 
interest rates, lower aggregate demand, and mitigate the appreciation in 
the real exchange rate.48 There are, however, two main difficulties with 
sterilized intervention. First, sterilization leads to an increase in the 
differential between the interest rate on domestic government debt and 
international reserves, thus creating a !1sca!(or quasi-fiscal) deficit. Second, 
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by preventing a fall in the domestic-foreign interest rate differential, 
sterilization tends to perpetuate the capital inflow thus exacerbating any 
problems caused by this inflow. The impact of sterilization on the interest 
differential can be seen in Figure 13.4, by comparing sterilizing cases, such 
as Chile and Colombia, against the nonsterilizing case of Argentina. It is 
seen that in the current capital-inflows episode, the domestic interest rate 
exhibits a much smaller decline (or an actual increase) in sterilizing than 
in nonsterilizing countries. The evidence from the recent experience of 
Chile and Colombia indicates that sterilized intervention has not reduced 
capital inflows. Yet, the increase in the fiscal deficit may be quite substantial; 
for example, Rodriguez (1991) estimates the fiscal burden of sterilized 
intervention in Colombia during 199I at about 0.5 percent of GDP. Consequently, 
serious doubts can be cast on the desirability of sterilized intervention 
in the cases where countries are still attempting to reduce domestic 
debt, and their public sector budgets require further trimming.49 
Alternatively, the central bank could opt for nonsterilized intervention, 
whereby the central bank purchases the foreign exchange brought in by 
the capital inflow in exchange for domestic money - as, for example, under 
a fixed exchange rate. This policy can help avoid nominal exchange 
rate appreciation, and is likely to narrow the domestic-foreign interest rate 
differential; however, it is likely to generate an increase in the domestic 
monetary base beyond the central bank's target. The latter, in turn, could 
fuel inflationary pressures and contribute to the real exchange rate appreciation. 
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It is at this point that credibility considerations about maintaining 
a fixed nominal exchange rate come into play. In this connection, 
floating exchange rates have an edge, because the required real exchange 
rate appreciation does not necessarily call for inflation to accelerate. Furthermore, 
floating rates allow the domestic central bank to operate as a 
"lender oflast resort." In contrast, under fixed rates and fractional-reserve 
banking, preventing liquidity-type financial crises - particularly, when 
capital starts flowing out - may call for the central bank to hold a large 
stock of international reserves, a costly jf not unfeasible undertaking.50 
Therefore, these credibility-related considerations give some support to a 
regime of floating exchange rates when the economy is subject to substantial 
capital flows. 51 
As discussed earlier, attempting to insulate the banking system from 
short-term capital flows is an attractive goal in cases where most of the 
inflows take the form of increased short-term bank deposits. In these circumstances, 
a sudden reversal of capital inflows may quickly result in bank 
failures. Under policy (5), marginal reserve requirements could be sharply 
raised such that they become higher as the maturity of deposits shortens; 
in fact, a 100 percent required-reserve ratio could be imposed on deposits 
with the shortest maturity. Although this scheme would impose a burden 
on the banking system, and could result in some disintermediation of the 
capital inflows, it has the advantage of decreasing banks' exposure to the 
risks of capital flow reversals. In addition, regulation that limits the exposure 
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of banks to the volatility in equity and real-estate markets would 
further insulate the banking system from the bubbles associated with sizable 
capital inflows. 
To summarize, there are grounds to support a policy intervention mix 
based on the imposition of a tax on short-term capital imports, on enhancing 
the flexibility of exchange rates, and on raising marginal reserve requirements 
on short-term bank deposits. Given the likely fiscal costs it is 
hard to make a strong case in favor of sterilized intervention, unless countries 
exhibit a strong fiscal stance, and capital inflows are expected to be 
short-lived. In any case, we believe that none of these policies will drastically 
change the behavior of real exchange rates or interest rates for an 
extended period of time. The choice of appropriate policies, however, 
could decidedly attenuate the detrimental effects of sudden and substan" 
tial future capital outflows. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Latin America is not the only region that has experienced increased capital inflows in 
1991. In fact, similar developments have occurred in Asia and the Middle East. At the 
same time, there had been a marked rise in capital outflows from the United States and 
Japan. 
 
2 See, e.g., Diaz-Alejandro (1983) and (1984). 
 
3. For a recent study of the effects of capital movements, see International Monetary 
Fund (1991). On the role of reforms and capital account liberalization, see Mathieson and 
Rojas-Suarez (1993). 
 
4 For a comparison of the current episode to the late 1970s, see Calvo, Leiderman, and 
Reinhart (1992). 
 
5 For tracing on the evolution over time of individual country ratings, see e.g., LDC Debt 
Report. 
 
6 The countries included in our sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 
7 The countries that make up the Asian sample are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
 
8 Notice that RA < 0 implies accumulation of reserves by the monetary authority. 
 
9 See also "Latin American Finance and Investment" Financial Times' April 6, 1992, 
Kuczynski (1992), and Salomon Brothers (Latin America includes the same set of 
countries). 
 
10 IMF' s World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics.  
 
11 These figuresG, DwPhich adrerelayvaoinlabplreehfmrol~llarty enaaUIt'Oonral'income 
accounts data [or 1.991. . 1 
as shares 0 .an I' sures to reverse capl'talfll'ght-such as amnestIes, ca.pit.a 
 
12 See Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993). 
 
13 Some of this increased borrowing may represent hidden repatriation of flight capital. 
 
14. See, e.g., El-Erian (1992) and Collyns et al. (1992). 
 
15. For a comprehensive discussion of the composition of the inflows in the current 
episode and how it compares with the inflows of the late I970s, see Collyns et al. (1992).  
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16 Brazil and Uruguay are exceptions to this pattern, as in both countries capital inflows 
were not accompanied by an increase in reserves. 
 
17 The IMF indexes of the real effective exchange rate are used, hence an appreciation is 
represented by an increase in the index. 
 
18 The surge in stock prices during 1991 has been followed by more moderate declines in 
1992. 
 
19 The price--earnings ratio in Argentina increased from 3.1 in 1990.4 to 38.9 in 1991.4; 
in Chile it increased from 8.9 in 1990.4 to 17.4 in 1991.4; and in Mexico it moved from 
13.2 in 1990.4 to 14.6 in 1991.4. These figures are from Emerging Markets Data Base, 
International Finance Corporation. 
 
20 See Salomon Brothers (1992). 
 
21 An implication of this discussion is that from the investor's perspective, the 
information content of a drop in U.S. interest rates is different from that of an equal rise 
in the domestic interest rate-while in both these cases the interest rate differential would 
change by the same amount. 
 
22 For instance, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Asia composite, which 
includes Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand, registered total returns (in dollars) of 83 
percent and 57 percent in 1988 and 1989, respectively. 
 
23 As Figure 13.3 illustrates, most of the Latin American stock markets have recently 
given up some of the earlier gains. Similarly, the Asian markets weakened during 1990 
and 1991 after the earlier surge. 
 
24 This, of course, does not explain Chile and Korea, where there has been a real 
exchange rate appreciation alongside a sharp rise in investment. 
 
25 For each of those two countries the decline amounted to 3.5 percent of GDP. 
 
26 This does not suggest that fiscal adjustment has not taken place in a number of Latin 
American countries, but rather that its timing did not coincide with the capital inflows. 
 
27 See Edwards (1989) for a comprehensive discussion of how these and other economic 
"fundamentals" affect the real exchange rate. 
 
28 Beyond short-term interest rates, returns from other investments in the United States 
have decreased recently as well-e.g., in the real-estate market. 
 
29 Some examples of this development are as follows: (I) There has been an increase in 
the amount of investments in foreign securities by mutual funds in the United States. As 
of May 1992, the assets of stock funds that invest largely outside the United States stood 
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at $41.8 billion, more than twice the level at the end of 1988, and assets of global funds 
have soared to $28.5 billion from just $3 billion in 1988. (2) In 1991, the sale of foreign 
shares in public and private deals doubled, to a record $9.78 billion. Bond deals rose 48 
percent to $55.33 billion. (3) New foreign investment in U.S.companies and real estate 
plummeted 66 percent in 1991. See the New York Times, July 5, 1992. 
 
30 As indicated earlier, private capital outflows from Japan also increased sharply, by 
$36 billion, in 1991. 
 
31 It is useful to recall how sizable these inflows to the United States were in the mid-
1980s (Table 13.4). From net capital outflows of about $20 billion a year in the late 
1970s, the private capital account turned around into surpluses (capital inflow), which 
peaked at $128 billion in 1985. This inflow, which mainly took the form of increased 
borrowing from abroad, was mostly used to finance high and increasing current account 
deficits that were well above $100 billion in the second half of the 1980s. 
 
32 See El-Erian (1992) for a comprehensive discussion. 
 
33. For an exposition of principal components analysis, see, e.g., Dhrymes (1970). 
Swoboda (1983), in an application that is close in spirit to ours, used this approach to 
examine economic interdependence across different exchange rate regimes for six of the 
G-7 countries. 
 
34 All the analysis that follows uses the logs of reserves and of the real exchange rate. 
 
35 If the ten series were identical (perfectly collinear), the first principal component 
would explain 100 percent of the variation of the original series. Alternatively, if all ten 
series were perfectly uncorrelated, it would take ten principal components to explain all 
of the variance in the original series; no advantage would be gained by looking at 
common factors, since none exist. 
 
36 The test statistics, which are distributed as a x" with 45 degrees of freedom, and the 
attendant probability values are presented at the bottom of Table 13.6. 
 
37 Applying a different methodology Engle and Issler (1992) find significant 
comovement in  the per capita GDP of several Latin American countries, as these 
countries share common trends and Common cycles. 
 
J8 Notice that, as shown in Figure 13.3, Brazil's real exchange rate depreciated through 
most of the sample period and its upturn came fairly late in the sample. Thus, it is not 
surprising to find that the regional exchange rate index, the first principal component, 
does poorly in capturing its fluctuations. In effect, their correlation is negative. These 
details are available upon request. 
39 Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) explore the possible role of external factors by 
examining the simple pairwise correlation coefficients between the principal components 
indexes for reserves and the real exchange rate and a set of variables from the United 
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States. It is hypothesized that a fall in U.S. interest- rates, stock market returns, real-estate 
returns, and economic activity would be associated with an increase in the capital inflow 
to Latin America which would be at least partly reflected in an increase in the regional 
indexes for reserves and the real exchange rate (the latter indicating a real exchange rate 
appreciation). As shown there, most of the evidence is indeed in this direction. 
 
40 Our procedure is similar to the DYMIMIC models associated with Watson and Engle 
(1983), and Stock and Watson (1989). One key difference in the approaches is that here 
we adopt a two-step procedure by first constructing the unobserved factor index (indexes) 
and then incorporating that factor(s) in a dynamic model. 
 
41 For simulation evidence on the efficacy of these criteria, see Lutkepohl (1985): 
 
4' Alternative orderings are explored. One alternative imposes that there be no 
contemporaneous relationship between reserves and the real exchange rate, while another 
treats reserves as the most "endogenous" variable in the system. The results do not differ 
appreeiciably from those presented here. 
 
43 Evidence suggesting the importance of U.S. economic developments on the Latin 
American business cycle is presented in Engle and Issler (1992). 
 
44 In terms of economic agents in Latin America, it is also possible to interpret these 
developments as originating in a portfolio shift away from foreign (dollar-denominated) 
and toward domestic financial and physical assets. For a model in which such a portfolio 
shift leads to a temporary appreciation of the real exchange rate and to accumulation of 
reserves by the central bank, see Calvo (I983). 
 
45 For a discussion of these issues from the perspective of Chilean monetary and 
exchange rate policies, see Zahler (1992). 
 
46 In addition, to the extent that it reduces the government's need to issue debt, a tighter 
fiscal stance is also likely to lower domestic interest rates. 
 
47 For a more detailed discussion of the role of central bank (sterilized and nonsterilized) 
intervention, see Mussa (1981) and Obstfcld (1991).  
 
48 A necessary condition for these outcomes, and for the ctfectj'veness of sterilized 
intervention, is that domestic and foreign bonds are imperfect substitutes in agents' 
portfolios, Casual observation suggests that this seems to be the case in Latin America. 
Cumby and Obstfeld (1983) produced econometric results for Mexico in the 1970s in 
support of imperfect substitutability between peso-denominated assets and foreign assets. 
For industrial countries, Obstfeld (1991) concludes that sterilized intervention is a weak 
instrument of exchange rate policy, and that monetary and fiscal policies, and not 
intervention per se, have been the main policy determinants of exchange rates in recent 
years. 
 
 53
49 See also Calvo (1991), which provides an example in which social welfare always 
declines with sterilization, and in which the effectiveness of sterilization relies on its 
worsening the credibility of an undergoing stabilization program. 
 
50 The problem is exacerbated when, as in most Latin American countries, the liabilities 
of the banking system are heavily biased toward short-term deposits, enhancing the 
chances of a run against the domestic banking system. 
 
51 When the system is not subject to big swings of international capital, the opposite 
conclusion can be reached: Fixed rates may dominate. See Calvo and  Vegh (1992). 
 
 
